Lawyers in the Shadow of the Regulatory State: Transnational Governance on Business and Human Rights by Regan, Milton C., Jr. & Hall, Kath
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 84 Issue 5 Article 8 
2016 
Lawyers in the Shadow of the Regulatory State: Transnational 
Governance on Business and Human Rights 
Milton C. Regan Jr. 
Georgetown University Law Center 
Kath Hall 
Australian National University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, 
and the International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Milton C. Regan Jr. and Kath Hall, Lawyers in the Shadow of the Regulatory State: Transnational 
Governance on Business and Human Rights, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 2001 (2016). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol84/iss5/8 
This Colloquium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 2001 
LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW 
OF THE REGULATORY STATE:  
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Milton C. Regan, Jr.* & Kath Hall** 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have seen increasing attention to the human rights impacts 
of transnational business operations.1  The 2011 United Nations (UN) 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“the Principles”), for 
instance, state:  “Business enterprises should respect human rights.  This 
means that they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and 
should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are 
involved.”2  The Principles describe this duty as not binding, but not 
voluntary.3  At the same time, imposing responsibility for adverse human 
rights impacts has been hampered by the absence of an international 
sovereign that can impose and enforce legally binding obligations.  In 
addition, the effectiveness of national regulation may be weakened by 
differences in the quality of legal systems or the inability to reach conduct 
beyond a country’s borders. 
One response to these challenges has been the rise of a system of 
transnational “governance.”  The term “governance” incorporates the 
network of actors, instruments, and mechanisms that to varying degrees 
regulate transnational corporations apart from formally authoritative state 
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laws.4  The actors within this system include international organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), industry and professional 
organizations, and private sector service providers.  The regulatory 
instruments include both “hard law” that is legally binding and “soft law” 
that is designed to influence behavior through more informal mechanisms.5  
This system of governance differs from conventional legal regulation in that 
both public and private actors are involved in rule formation, many 
provisions are voluntary, there often is no formal penalty for violations, and 
anticipated financial or reputational concerns sometimes may be the most 
significant determinant of behavior. 
In light of these differences, we ask what, if any, role is there for lawyers 
to advise business clients on human rights?  Is there a legal duty to respect 
human rights?  Does the answer to that question determine whether a 
company looks to lawyers for advice on human rights issues, as opposed to 
seeking advice from management consultants or other professionals who 
advise on corporate social responsibility or sustainability? 
In this Article, we begin to explore such questions by drawing on 
interviews6 with twenty-nine lawyers involved in the business and human 
rights field.  These interviews indicate that awareness of the range of 
governance initiatives that exist in this area still is limited to a relatively 
small group of elite lawyers and that even amongst these lawyers, there is 
no consistent approach being adopted to providing advice on the issues.  
Whereas some lawyers are finding regular opportunities to raise concerns 
about human rights impacts of their client’s operations, others are still 
developing a systematic approach to providing this advice.  Advising clients 
on human rights issues is easiest when their impact potentially creates legal 
liability.  However, even in cases involving nonbinding standards, lawyers 
may advise on reputational and illegal impacts, or alert clients that 
standards indicate an emerging consensus on issues that may eventually be 
incorporated into “hard law.”  Finally, multinational companies and those 
with extended supply chains are especially likely to want advice on the full 
range of human rights issues relevant to their operations.  This may include 
advice on potential criticism by NGOs, customers, investors, shareholders, 
or other stakeholders.  While lawyers have no professional monopoly on 
identifying such risks, they may be in an especially advantageous position 
to warn companies about them.  This may particularly be the case for inside 
counsel, although outside counsel also contribute to this process.  In these 
ways, lawyers are beginning to play an important role in strengthening the 
system of transnational governance that regulates business and human 
rights. 
In setting the background to our discussion of lawyers’ role in this 
context, Part I of this Article provides a general overview of the emergence 
of the transnational governance regime.  Part II then describes some of the 
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governance instruments that attempt to prevent and rectify the adverse 
human rights impacts of business activities.  Part III discusses the extent to 
which lawyers are advising their business clients on human rights issues, 
the factors that may inhibit or encourage the provision of such advice, and 
how the lawyers who are raising these issues are framing these discussions 
with their clients.  Finally, Part IV suggests further areas of inquiry that 
may enrich our understanding of the role that lawyers can play in helping 
construct a transnational governance regime on business and human rights. 
I.  THE GROWTH OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS AND GOVERNANCE 
This part discusses the dynamics that have prompted greater economic 
globalization over the last few decades and how this trend has prompted 
efforts to hold transnational businesses accountable for the impacts of their 
operations.  Part I.A describes how public policies, technological 
innovation, and corporate strategies have resulted in business activities that 
increasingly span multiple national boundaries.  Part I.B discusses how 
divergence in regulation among different countries both creates 
opportunities for business advantage and prompts efforts to achieve some 
degree of transnational regulatory convergence.  Finally, Part I.C describes 
the system of transnational governance that has emerged, which reflects a 
combination of actors and initiatives that aim to address the impacts of 
transnational business operations. 
A.  Intensifying Economic Globalization 
Over the last few decades, transnational governance efforts have occurred 
against the backdrop of public policies that have focused on removing 
formal trade barriers, capital market restrictions, and national regulation 
that create obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, and 
investment.7  These policies reflect the belief that the best way to achieve 
economic progress in many developing countries is by focusing on an 
export strategy that capitalizes on the lower costs of labor and other 
resources within these jurisdictions.8  In particular, during the last decades 
of the twentieth century, declining communication and transportation costs, 
along with improved logistics technology, significantly increased the 
potential for globally integrated markets.9  As a result, more companies 
developed business activities around the world.  Manufacturing companies 
in particular began to move parts of their operations to jurisdictions with 
lower costs and less demanding regulatory regimes. 
 
 7. See generally ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM:  RE-
IMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2011); MONICA PRASAD, THE POLITICS OF FREE 
MARKETS:  THE RISE OF NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICIES IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY 
AND THE UNITED STATES (2006). 
 8. See generally JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002). 
 9. See GLENN MORGAN, PEER HULL KRISTENSEN & RICHARD WHITLEY, THE 
MULTINATIONAL FIRM:  ORGANIZING ACROSS INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIONAL DIVIDES 287–88 
(2001); SOL PICCIOTTO, REGULATING GLOBAL CORPORATE CAPITALIZATION (2011); JOHN 
RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS, at xxvii–xxx (2013). 
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Around the same time, the structure of operations in many major 
companies began to move from mass production and consumption toward 
differentiated markets and flexible production.  This led many companies to 
reduce their investment in fixed assets and to move toward reliance on 
outside suppliers that are able to configure their products in response to 
changes in market conditions.  As a result, operating models developed that 
involved networks of multiple entities in supply chains that stretched across 
several countries.  These networks involved a move toward a production 
process that focused on subsidiaries and independent contractors, each 
contributing specific inputs at various stages along the supply chain.  Many 
contractors also developed their own supply chains by subcontracting out 
portions of the process for which they were responsible.  In some cases, 
large companies completely abandoned any involvement in the production 
of their goods, instead focusing on marketing products and maintaining a 
corporate image with which their consumers could easily identify. 
Such developments did not automatically enable companies to operate 
seamlessly across jurisdictions.  Instead, the reduction of trade and 
technological barriers revealed a world of multiple legal systems that 
imposed differing, and at times conflicting, legal demands.  As Sol 
Picciotto puts it, “Th[e] shift towards more ‘open’ national economies did 
not create a unified and free world market but, like an outgoing tide, it 
revealed a craggy landscape of diverse national and local regulations.”10  
Tim Buthe and Walter Matli observe that national differences in product 
standards became more visible and more economically important “because 
they now impeded trade in goods that few had even thought of exporting or 
importing previously, when transport costs and tariffs had made trade 
prohibitively costly.”11  As a result, companies faced a world of regulatory 
divergence with differing regulations on environmental impacts, labor 
conditions, securities disclosures, insolvency, sales practices, data privacy, 
intellectual property protection, investment conditions, and many other 
issues within each jurisdiction in which they operate. 
B.  Regulatory Divergence and Convergence 
The existence of differences between national legal systems opened up 
opportunities for companies to benefit from regulatory divergence even as it 
simultaneously created pressure for regulatory convergence.  Transnational 
companies benefit from divergence by locating activities in jurisdictions 
with the fewest constraints on the pursuit of profitability.  Countries often 
compete vigorously for foreign investment by tailoring their regulatory 
regimes to the needs of such companies.  The result can be the proverbial 
 
 10. PICIOTTO, supra note 9, at 10. 
 11. TIM BUTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS:  THE PRIVATIZATION OF 
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“race to the bottom,” in which jurisdictions with the least onerous 
regulatory demands capture the most investment.12 
While the transnational company can benefit from regulatory divergence, 
its global operations also require a certain amount of regulatory 
convergence.  A company subject to multiple conflicting legal demands as 
it moves goods, services, and capital across jurisdictions can incur 
substantial administrative costs in meeting these demands.  Furthermore, 
officials in different countries may possess varying amounts of discretion in 
interpreting and enforcing national laws, based on political and cultural 
considerations that are opaque to outsiders.  This can introduce considerable 
unpredictability for a company that is attempting to allocate capital among 
competing internal operations and to assess the performance of multiple 
profit centers based on common metrics.  At least some degree of 
regulatory convergence across jurisdictions is necessary to reduce this 
threat. 
Large law firms benefit from both regulatory divergence and 
convergence.  With respect to divergence, a firm’s familiarity with the law 
enables it to advise on how a particular jurisdiction’s legal regime will 
affect a company’s operations and to assist a client to structure business 
activities so as to comply with the relevant legal requirements.  It also 
enables the firm to advise on the legal risks that a company may face by 
organizing its operations in certain ways and the remedies that should be 
available if its investment is threatened.  This enables companies to 
calculate the expected costs and benefits of locating operations in different 
jurisdictions and assists managers in maximizing financial returns across a 
system of divergent regulatory demands. 
Lawyers can also be involved in activities aimed at achieving regulatory 
convergence.  In particular, there has been a growing focus on the creation 
of rules, standards, and guidelines that are applicable across national 
borders.  While these instruments may be created by law firms, more often, 
lawyers advise and assist international organizations, NGOs, industry 
bodies, and private service providers to develop standards aimed at 
convergence.  These efforts enhance the ability of companies to operate 
across multiple boundaries by making the environment in which they 
operate more predictable, even though some differences may remain.  Such 
uniformity enables companies to assess with greater precision the 
profitability of various activities across the globe, thereby improving their 
ability to efficiently allocate capital. 
Harmonizing rules and standards across borders can also contribute to a 
company’s “social license” to operate in various countries.13  This 
increasingly important license reflects community support for a company’s 
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activities based on the perception that those activities are legitimate and in 
accordance with basic notions of justice.  Failing to obtain such support can 
be costly for a company.  These costs may include consumer boycotts, 
drops in share price, increases in the cost of capital, damage to reputation, 
or host country reluctance to approve investments or projects.14 
The results of efforts by lawyers and others to achieve regulatory 
convergence form part of the emerging system of transnational governance.  
This system has various features that distinguish it from conventional 
government regulation.  In particular, in the absence of a single 
transnational regulatory body, both public and private entities are now 
involved in creating binding and nonbinding instruments that seek to 
establish common rules and standards to govern transnational commercial 
activities. 
C.  Systems of Transnational Governance 
In the absence of an international sovereign with regulatory authority 
over global corporate activities, transnational actors have increasingly 
looked to other forms of “law making” that can create what Niklas 
Luhmann calls “a social system which depends upon the congruent 
generalisation of normative behavioral expectations.”15  The result has been 
the development of systems of “transnational governance” in areas such as 
sale of goods, insurance, insolvency, intellectual property, environmental 
protection, anticorruption, and human rights.16 
These systems of transnational governance have several distinctive 
features.  First, transnational governance involves a range of both public 
and private actors.  These generally include international organizations, 
NGOs, industry groups, professional organizations, private sector service 
providers (including lawyers), and major corporations.  This means that, as 
Jennifer Green puts it, “[T]he right to make rules is not restricted to 
states.”17  Authority in this setting arises not from formal legal delegation, 
but from the willingness of others to be bound by a party’s guidance.  As 
Green argues, “[W]hen actors consent to be bound by rules, they create 
authority.”18  Such consent largely rests on the legitimacy of the actor, 
which in turn is based on qualities such as technical expertise, an inclusive 
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deliberative process, or a dominant position in a relevant market.  Thus, 
“[A]uthority need not be legally binding to gain adherents.  If private actors 
are able to legitimate their claims to authority, others will voluntarily adopt 
the rules.  Potential governors then acquire authority and become governors 
in fact.”19 
Second, transnational rules and standards develop in a range of less 
formal contexts than those in which traditional governmental regulation 
occurs.  Martin Haajer and Hendrik Wagenaar suggest that “there is a move 
from the familiar topography of formal political institutions to the edges of 
organizational activity, negotiations between sovereign bodies, and inter-
organizational networks that challenged the established distinction between 
public and private.”20  Thus, gatherings convened by international 
organizations and NGOs, industry conferences, meetings of professional 
associations, and informal communications among actors in various 
networks are all possible sites where ideas are proposed, developed, and 
refined. 
Third, transnational governance regimes incorporate a range of binding 
and nonbinding instruments including national and international laws, 
industry and commercial standards, corporate codes of conduct, and 
guidelines issued by international organizations and professional bodies.  
The nature and effect of these instruments is not as sharp as the distinction 
between hard and soft law.21  For instance, compliance with voluntary 
standards is often monitored by NGOs, consumer groups, and investment 
consultants who may then criticize a company for noncompliance.  This can 
serve as a form of informal enforcement, with serious financial and 
reputational consequences flowing from it. 
Companies may also incorporate voluntary standards into their contracts 
with retailers and manufacturers, so that failure to comply with the 
standards can be a basis for future termination.  Voluntary standards and 
 
 19. Id. at 30.  Some transnational actors also acquire authority and legitimacy through 
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ANALYSIS:  UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THE NETWORK SOCIETY 3 (Maarten Hajer & 
Hendrik Wagenaar eds., 2003). 
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and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law.” Kenneth W. Abbott 
& Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 421 
(2000).  By contrast, “[t]he realm of ‘soft law’ begins once legal arrangements are weakened 
along one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation.” Id. at 422. 
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principles may become sufficiently accepted that they are incorporated into 
national legislation.  Finally, transnational rules and norms can circulate 
throughout networks, with various actors incorporating them into their 
practices in ways that reinforce their influence.  Thus, as Sigrid Quack has 
observed, transnational lawmaking “represents global institution building 
that involves continuous transformations between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
regulation.”22 
Finally, transnational governance operates primarily through networks of 
loosely connected actors rather than in top-down, command-and-control 
fashion.  Sol Picciotto suggests that the network metaphor expresses “[t]he 
destabilization of normative hierarchy” and reflects the absence of a unified 
sovereign with undisputed regulatory authority over transnational 
activities.23  Saskia Sassen argues that transnational governance is creating 
“new assemblages of authority, rights and power and . . . diverse 
jurisdictional geographies” that unsettle national and international 
authority.24  As Picciotto notes, this central feature of governance 
distinguishes the post-liberal from the classical liberal system.25  In the 
latter, legal rules fell into relatively clear categories and hierarchies, with 
international law binding states and national or local law governing legal 
persons.26  This made it possible, at least in principle, to determine the 
validity of rules and to decide which should apply in a particular situation.  
In networked governance, normative systems overlap and interpenetrate 
each other and the determination of the legitimacy of an activity under any 
one system is rarely definitive, as powerful actors may be able to challenge 
it by reference to another system.  The result is that “in this ‘network 
society’ the public and the private, which were never truly separate social 
spheres, have become harder to distinguish, and their interactions and 
permutations have become more complex.”27 
An important consequence of the networked nature of transnational 
governance is what Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers describe as 
“recursivity.”28  The recursive process involves ongoing exchange, 
contestation, negotiation, and revision of norms among the international, 
national, and local level.  Various actors compete to have their respective 
descriptions and diagnoses become the accepted way to identify what is 
labeled as a “problem.”  This has ramifications for which measures are seen 
as appropriate responses, as well as which actors are best situated to take 
the lead in addressing the problem.  The concept of recursivity thus 
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 25. See PICOTTO, supra note 9, at 13. 
 26. See id. at 28. 
 27. Id. at 8. 
 28. See generally Terence C. Halliday & Bruce C. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law:  
Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Industry 
Regimes, 112 AJS 1135 (2007). 
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“replaces a global-centric, top-down concept of norms traveling from the 
center to the periphery with a dynamic, recursive process of exchange and 
negotiation between transnational, national, and even local norms.”29 
II.  BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
This part discusses the increasing attention to the human rights impacts 
of business operations over the last few decades and the initiatives that have 
resulted from such attention.  Part II.A describes some of the major events 
that served to heighten awareness of the risk to human rights from business 
activities.  Part II.B describes the major international instruments that 
address human rights in general, while Part II.C focuses on the leading 
global programs that address human rights in the context of business 
operations. 
A.  The Growing Attention to Business and Human Rights 
The development of a transnational governance regime focused on 
business and human rights developed out of a growing global awareness of 
the possible human rights impacts of business activities.  A number of 
global events led to this awareness.  One of the earliest was the December 
1984 gas leak at Union Carbide’s pesticide plant in Bhopal, India.30  Union 
Carbide India Limited (UCIL) was 50.9 percent owned by a U.S. parent 
company and 49.1 percent owned by Indian banks and private 
shareholders.31  The leak resulted in methyl isocyanate circulating through 
the shanty towns surrounding the plant, causing almost 3800 confirmed 
deaths and another 3900 permanent severely disabling injuries.32  One study 
found that the spontaneous abortion rate and the still birth rates in the area 
following the gas leak were more than three times the national average.33 
The effects of the disaster on the U.S. parent company were significant.  
Six months after the leak, the New York Times reported that Union Carbide 
had “seen its stock plummet, its financial health challenged by multi-billion 
dollar lawsuits and the pace of its strategic acquisitions slow due to 
problems in raising cash.”34  Numerous lawsuits alleging common law tort 
violations were filed by victims in the United States and India at both the 
 
 29. TERRENCE HALLIDAY & GREGORY SHAFFER, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 693 
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 31. See RUGGIE, supra note 9, at 6–8. 
 32. ECKERMAN, supra note 30. 
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state and federal levels.35  In 1989, Union Carbide made a payment of $470 
million, which was criticized as severely inadequate.36 
The catastrophic consequences of the disaster prompted some of the first 
global efforts to frame business responsibility in terms of international 
human rights.  Several national and international NGOs were established, 
some of which still focus on providing assistance to the victims today.37  
Attempts were also made to respond to the regulatory gap in corporate 
liability for harms caused overseas.  For example, the Charter on Industrial 
Hazards (“the Charter”) was created to “reflect the views and concerns of 
persons injured and distressed by industrial hazards.”38  The Charter was 
finalized in 1996 and invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International 
Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and several other 
relevant international human rights instruments.39 
Other early cases that focused attention on the impacts of business 
activities in the extractive industry included Royal Dutch Shell’s operations 
in the 1980s and early 1990s in the Ogoniland area of Nigeria40 and 
Talisman Energy’s operations in Sudan.41  Growing public attention also 
was drawn to allegations of human rights abuses in large global supply 
chains.  Nike was one of the first manufacturing companies to face this 
scrutiny due to the outsourcing of all of its production into Asia.  Problems 
within Nike’s supplier factories included low wages, abusive and unsafe 
working conditions, and the use of child labor.  The result was a that the 
company became “a poster child for corporate villainy,”42 with violent 
strikes at several factories and protests over the sale of Nike products in 
twenty-eight U.S. states and twelve countries. 
The result of the widespread campaign against Nike was increased 
awareness of labor conditions in global supply chains.  It also brought 
together labor and consumer advocates and marked the emergence of a 
significant transnational NGO network that continues to monitor and 
publicize the human rights impacts of business operations.43  Mobilization 
of these groups demonstrated the major impact that widespread publicity 
could have on a company’s reputation.  Many subsequent consumer 
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boycotts and “naming and shaming” campaigns against major companies 
followed the template established during the activities directed at Nike. 
By 2007, it was clear that human rights abuses by corporations operating 
outside their home jurisdiction were significant and widespread.  A Harvard 
report on 320 cases alleged to have occurred between 2005 and 2007 found 
that the extractive industry accounted for the largest percentage of 
allegations, followed by the retail and consumer product sector, the 
pharmaceutical industry, the infrastructure and utility sector, and the food 
and beverage industry.44  Alleged violations by clothing and sporting goods 
companies had the most impact on workers, while the extractive community 
had the most effect on communities. 
While 60 percent of the adverse impacts were caused directly by 
transnational companies, 40 percent were indirect impacts caused by third 
parties such as suppliers, individuals, states, representatives of states, and 
other businesses.45  The report concluded: 
[T]he presence of all sectors and regions in the allegations supports the 
need for all corporate actors to consider the human rights implications of 
their activities.  Moreover, the study indicates that the subject of this 
consideration should not be a short-list of rights but actually the full range 
of human rights.  And given the number of allegations of indirect abuse, 
firms should also consider the human rights records and activities of those 
with whom they have relationships—the allegations show that a firm may 
be held accountable by stakeholders where it contributes to or benefits 
from third party abuses.46 
Reports such as this were significant in the lead up to the release of the draft 
Principles in 2008 that we discuss below.47  The lack of effective remedies 
under this regime, however, was made clear in 2013 with the Rana Plaza 
collapse in Dhaka, Bangladesh.48  Bangladesh is the world’s second-largest 
apparel exporting nation behind China, and the Rana Plaza building 
contained several factories that manufactured clothing for companies from 
Europe and the United States, including Bennetton, Bonmarché, Monsoon, 
Mango, Matalan, Primark, and Walmart.49  When the factory caught fire on 
April 24, 2013, 1129 people died, with another 2515 injured.50  More than 
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half of the victims were women, along with a number of their children who 
were in nurseries within the building.51 
The day before the collapse, a television news program showed cracks in 
the building, and government authorities had requested an evacuation until 
an inspection could be conducted.  Later that day, however, the owner of 
the factory declared that the building was safe and that workers should 
return the next day.  Some commentators argued that the decision by 
managers to send workers back into the factories was due to pressure from 
overseas companies to complete orders.  The head of the Bangladesh Fire 
Service & Civil Defense said that the upper four floors had been built 
without a permit.  The building’s architect noted that the building was 
planned for shops and offices, not for factories.  One garment 
manufacturer’s website indicated that the building had been built on a pond 
without authorization and that substandard material was used during 
construction, which led to an overload of the structure that was aggravated 
by vibrations from generators in the building. 
The disaster triggered large demonstrations and some rioting in 
Bangladesh.  In November, a ten-story garment factory that supplied 
Western brands was allegedly burned down by workers angered over 
rumors that a demonstrating worker had died from police fire.  The 
Bangladeshi government announced that new measures to ensure safety 
would lead to the closure of several garment plants.  Seven inspectors were 
suspended and accused of negligence for renewing the licenses of garment 
factories in the building.  In June 2015, Bangladeshi police filed murder 
charges in connection with the collapse against forty-two people, including 
the owners of the building. 
The International Labour Organization (ILO), in consultation with 
government, industry, and labor representatives, investigated the collapse 
and issued a set of recommendations.  In addition to calling for 
strengthening building and safety codes and practices, it emphasized the 
importance of the Bangladeshi government passing legislation to “improve 
protection, in law and practice, for the fundamental rights to freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining, as well as occupational 
safety and health.”52 
Of the twenty-nine brands identified as having sourced products from the 
Rana Plaza factories, nine attended meetings in November 2013 to agree on 
a proposal for compensation to the victims.53  By March 2014, seven of 
these brands had contributed to the Rana Plaza Donor’s Trust Fund 
compensation fund, which is backed by the ILO.  In July 2013, a group of 
seventeen major North American retailers that included Wal-Mart, Gap, 
Target, and Macy’s announced the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker 
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Safety54 (“the Alliance”).  Members of the Alliance pledged funding of at 
least $42 million for an inspection project, with some others promising 
loans totaling $100 million to help finance necessary safety improvements.  
Around the same time, seventy European companies announced an accord 
under which they agreed to inspect all of the factories they use in 
Bangladesh within nine months, develop plans to remedy problems that are 
identified, and “ensure that sufficient funds are available to pay for 
renovations and other safety improvements.”55  Some labor organizations 
and NGOs praised the European program in contrast to the U.S. one, on the 
ground that the former committed the companies to paying for whatever 
improvements in the factories were necessary.56 
As this event demonstrates, public and political pressure continue to be 
brought to bear on transnational companies to fill the governance gap 
existing around liability for human rights violations caused by their 
operations, producers, and suppliers.  Influential actors increasingly regard 
the human rights impacts of business operations as not solely the 
responsibility of the countries in which companies do business, but as an 
issue of international concern requiring collaboration among a variety of 
parties.  As we discuss below, initiatives to deal with this gap are 
developing.  To date, however, none have imposed binding obligations or 
liability on companies with respect to the human rights impacts of their 
activities. 
B.  Key Governance Instruments 
and Initiatives on Human Rights 
While a range of legal approaches has been adopted with respect to 
business and human rights, each involves its own distinct combination of 
actors, procedures, and incentives.  Some encourage companies to identify 
and disclose voluntarily the impacts of their operations.  Others involve 
mandatory reporting requirements but do not prescribe specific conduct.  
Still, others consist of private regulatory schemes to which companies can 
voluntarily adhere.  These approaches all tend to take the form of rules and 
instruments that are not legally enforceable, but which still have the 
potential to influence business reputation and credibility.  Furthermore, as 
some standards become more widely accepted, there is an increasing 
likelihood that they will be incorporated into national law through common 
law standards of care or government regulation. 
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All of these governance initiatives exist alongside or under the 
international law framework that places responsibility on states to regulate 
and protect human rights.  The original document setting forth general 
human rights principles is the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights57 (“the Declaration”).  Two further UN covenants, namely the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights58 and the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights Convention on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights,59 together with the Declaration, constitute the 
International Bill of Human Rights.60  States fulfill their responsibilities 
under these and other treaties through the adoption of domestic law or 
direct incorporation of the treaty in their domestic legal systems.  While the 
obligations set forth in the Declaration are directed to “every organ of 
society,”61 the traditional perspective distinguishes between public and 
private actors.  As such, “The state is seen as the main entity responsible for 
implementing programmes to reduce poverty, to promote human 
development and generally to protect and promote human rights.”62 
The International Bill of Human Rights has been supplemented by 
additional UN treaties that elaborate upon prohibitions against racial 
discrimination, discrimination against women, and torture.  These treaties 
also affirm the rights of children, migrant workers, and persons with 
disabilities.  In addition, the ILO has adopted conventions dealing with 
workplace rights.  The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work63 (“the ILO Declaration”) lists freedom of association and 
recognition of collective bargaining; elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labor; abolition of child labor; and elimination of 
discrimination with regard to employment and occupation.64  While the 
next section discusses the major programs on the global level, there are a 
variety of other initiatives that focus on specific issues or industries, with a 
combination of public and private actors involved in their creation and 
implementation.65 
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C.  The Leading Global Programs 
1.  The UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights 
After decades of pressure to create a system of governance dealing with 
business and human rights, the Principles were adopted in 2011 by the UN 
Human Rights Council.66  The Principles are the product of a project 
coordinated by Professor John Ruggie, acting as Special Representative of 
the Secretary General of the UN.67  Since their adoption in 2011, the 
Principles have gained acceptance as a useful framework for structuring 
both governmental and business approaches to meeting human rights 
obligations. 
The Principles were preceded by the 2003 publication of Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights (“the Norms”), which were 
prepared by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights.68  The Norms provided that business enterprises, in addition 
to states, were responsible for promoting and securing the human rights set 
forth in the Declaration.  The draft of the Norms elaborated that “[w]ithin 
their respective spheres of activity and influence,” companies “have the 
obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of 
and protect human rights recognized in international as well as national 
law.”69  The Norms thus imposed on companies a duty not only to respect 
human rights, but also the same duties as states to promote and fulfill these 
rights. 
The Norms generated considerable controversy, and the UN Commission 
on Human Rights ultimately declined to endorse them.  Professor Ruggie 
also explicitly rejected this approach at the outset of his project, stating that 
“the divisive debate over the Norms obscures rather than illuminates 
promising areas of consensus and cooperation among business, civil 
society, governments and international institutions with respect to human 
rights.”70  As a result, the Principles were organized around states’ existing 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; the role of business enterprises in complying with all applicable 
laws and respecting human rights; and the need for rights and obligations to 
be matched to appropriate and effective remedies when breached.  The 
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Principles thus rest on the notion of three core obligations (or pillars):  
states are to protect human rights, businesses are to respect them, and both 
are to provide appropriate remedies for their violation. 
The responsibility to respect human rights requires businesses to avoid 
infringing human rights and to address any adverse impacts “with which 
they are involved.”71  The source of the rights is primarily the International 
Bill of Human Rights and the ILO Declaration.  The commentary to the 
Principles states:  “The responsibility of business enterprises to respect 
human rights is distinct from issues of legal liability and enforcement, 
which remain defined largely by national law provisions in relevant 
jurisdictions.”72  Furthermore, the responsibility “exists independently of 
States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfill their own human rights 
obligations, and does not diminish those obligations.  And it exists over and 
above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human 
rights.”73  When national law conflicts with international human rights 
principles, businesses “are expected to respect the principles of 
internationally recognized human rights to the greatest extent possible in 
the circumstances.”74 
The Principles provide that businesses must not cause or contribute to 
adverse human rights impacts through their own activities and must also 
seek to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts that are “directly linked to their 
operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they 
have not contributed to those impacts.”75  The commentary to the Principles 
states that “activities” include both actions and omissions and that business 
relationships include those with “business partners, entities in its value 
chain, and any other non-State or State entity directly linked to its business 
operations, products or services.”76 
To meet their responsibilities, it is recommended that businesses have in 
place a formal commitment to respect human rights, approved at the most 
senior level of the company; a due diligence process to identify, prevent, 
mitigate, and account for the company’s impact on human rights; and a 
process to provide remedies for any adverse impacts they cause or to which 
they contribute.77  In engaging in due diligence, it is recommended that 
companies evaluate actual and potential violations—a process that should 
include both reliance on experts and meaningful consultation with 
potentially affected groups.  They also should publicly communicate these 
efforts to all stakeholders, including those on whom their business 
operations may have an impact. 
With respect to remedies, the Principles suggest that businesses establish 
“operational-level grievance mechanisms” for those adversely affected by 
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the companies’ operations.78  Such processes should be “[b]ased on 
engagement and dialogue” with stakeholder groups for whose use they are 
intended.79  Grievance procedures should be seen as legitimate, accessible, 
predictable, equitable, transparent, consistent with internationally 
recognized human rights, and a source of continuous learning. 
The European Union endorsed the Principles in its 2011 Corporate Social 
Responsibility Strategy and is committed to support their implementation.80  
The American Bar Association and the U.S. government also endorsed the 
Principles,81 and the provisions have been incorporated into the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises82 (“the OECD Guidelines”) and the 
International Finance Corporation’s Sustainability Framework.83  To 
support the adoption of the Principles, the UN Human Rights Council 
established a Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (“the Working 
Group”) to promote dissemination and implementation of the Principles.  
The Working Group has encouraged states to meet their responsibility to 
protect human rights by developing National Action Plans on Business and 
Human Rights and has published guidance on how states should engage in 
this process.  As of February 2016, ten countries had completed plans, 
nineteen were in the process of doing so (including the United States), and 
civil society organizations had taken initial steps to develop plans in seven 
other countries.84 
A UN Working Group on the issue of business and human rights reported 
to the General Assembly in May 2015 that the Principles have been 
incorporated into frameworks of international organizations, regional 
organizations, countries, industry bodies, and companies.85  While the 
Principles are the most significant initiative to date that places 
responsibility on businesses with respect to human rights impacts, other 
initiatives operate alongside the Principles to create a broad framework of 
transnational governance.  None of these initiatives, however, create 
widespread obligations on companies to address the human rights impacts 
of their operations.  This means that, as discussed in Part III below, lawyers 
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advising corporate clients adopt a range of approaches to the relevance of 
the governance framework on business and human rights.86 
2.  OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
The OECD Guidelines were established in 1976 and set forth principles 
of good business practice that are consistent with applicable laws and 
internationally recognized standards.87  While the original OECD 
Guidelines focused on companies’ compliance with the law of the host 
countries in which they do business, the current version places more 
emphasis on international standards.88  This current version contains a 
separate chapter on human rights and follows the framework of the 
Principles.  The OECD Guidelines provide that companies should respect 
human rights and, at a minimum, should be guided by the International Bill 
of Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out 
in the ILO Declaration.89 
Similar to the Principles, the OECD Guidelines state that enterprises 
should have a policy commitment to respect human rights; avoid causing or 
contributing to adverse human rights impacts; seek ways to prevent or 
mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their 
business operations, products, or services by a business relationship, even if 
they do not contribute to those impacts; conduct due diligence to identify 
risks of adverse human rights impacts that they might cause, or to which 
they might contribute or be directly linked; and provide redress for human 
rights violations for which they are responsible.90 
The OECD Guidelines are voluntary and cannot be enforced against 
multinational companies.  They do, however, require participating states to 
establish and fund National Contact Points (NCP) where complaints can be 
filed by members of the public, NGOs, unions, and governments about 
failure to comply with the OECD Guidelines.91  Participation in the 
complaint process is voluntary.  In general, the NCPs are expected to 
provide consultation and assistance to companies accused of 
noncompliance to help them conform their conduct to the OECD 
Guidelines, although they are not able to monitor implementation of any 
agreement that is reached through this process. 
Since its establishment, the U.K.’s NCP has been especially active, 
moving toward a quasi-judicial process that in some cases culminates in a 
determination on whether a company has failed to comply with the OECD 
Guidelines.92  Although it has no authority to impose changes on company 
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practice, the NCP does make recommendations on how companies can 
improve their compliance with the OECD Guidelines.  Not all NCPs have 
assumed as active a role as in the United Kingdom, however, nor do many 
have the resources to do so. 
3.  UN Global Compact 
The UN Global Compact (“the Compact”) is a voluntary initiative 
established in 2000 to provide a framework for companies to report their 
efforts dealing with issues such as human rights, labor conditions, the 
environment, and anticorruption.93  It is designed to serve as a “call to 
companies to align strategies and operations with universal principles on 
human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption, and take actions that 
advance societal goals.”94  More than eight thousand businesses and four 
thousand nonbusiness organizations have joined the Compact.95  
Participants agree to abide by ten basic principles, which are derived from 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Declaration, the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, and the UN Convention 
Against Corruption.  The two principles that relate to human rights are that 
businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally 
proclaimed human rights and make sure they are not complicit in human 
rights abuses. 
Companies that are members of the Compact submit an annual report that 
is posted on the UN website.  A company must provide an explanation if it 
is not reporting on any aspect of the Principles.  Companies that meet the 
minimum requirements are designated as “GC Active,” while those that go 
beyond the minimum requirements by reporting on the company’s 
implementation of advanced criteria and best practices qualify as “GC 
Advanced.”96 
If a participant does not submit a report that meets the minimum 
requirements, it is given twelve months to resubmit, after which time it is 
designated as “non-communicating” on the Compact website.97  If the 
company then fails to submit a conforming report within twelve months, it 
is expelled from the Compact and has to reapply.98  As of February 2016, 
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there were 1436 “non-communicating” participants and 6160 that had been 
expelled.99 
While the idea behind the Compact is that stakeholders will use the 
information to assess and engage with companies on the issues discussed, 
some observers have criticized it for failing to prescribe specific 
requirements for participating companies and leaving it to them to 
determine how to implement the broadly defined standards.  The concern is 
that companies may enhance their reputations simply by signing the 
Compact without making serious commitments to operating in a sustainable 
fashion.  The extent to which the Compact has prompted changes in 
behavior is also unclear.  As one scholar concluded, “[As] the goal of the 
[Compact] is to serve as a ‘learning platform,’ it is difficult to devise a 
metric for measuring its impact, if any, on corporate behavior.”100 
III.  ADVISING BUSINESSES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
As discussed above, most initiatives aimed at increasing business 
responsibility to respect human rights consist of nonbinding standards that 
have few formal legal consequences.101  In particular, the rights that the 
duty to respect is intended to protect under the Principles are contained in 
advisory instruments that are unenforceable or in treaties that impose 
obligations only upon nation-states.  Furthermore, the rights in such 
documents are expressed in very broad terms, such that the meaning may 
vary considerably in different situations.  The business duty to respect 
human rights thus differs from conventional legal obligations on which 
lawyers typically advise clients.  What, if any, role does this leave for 
lawyers with respect to this duty? 
We looked for answers to this question in interviews with twenty-nine 
persons involved in the business and human rights field.  Two were senior 
lawyers in corporate legal departments, while thirteen were in law firms.  
Of those in law firms, six were mid-level partners or counsel, and seven 
were senior partners or counsel.  The remaining fourteen interviews were 
with mid-level or senior people in organizations that focus or advise on 
business and human rights.  Eight interviews were conducted in person, 
while the rest were conducted via telephone or Skype video.  All interviews 
were an hour or an hour-and-a-quarter.  While the group does not represent 
a random sample, it does consist of people with considerable expertise in 
business and human rights.  Their observations provide useful insights into 
the dynamics that shape the business duty to respect human rights and 
lawyers’ provision of advice on this duty. 
The discussion below focuses on a number of factors that we found 
influence lawyers’ willingness to advise on business and human rights.  The 
first is the nonbinding nature of human rights obligations, which can cause 
reluctance and uncertainty for lawyers in approaching the issue.  The 
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second is the different ways in which lawyers frame issues of human rights 
to make them more relevant to their clients’ interests.  Of the various 
options available, the risk management lexicon was considered the most 
effective in engaging clients on human rights issues.  The final factor 
affecting lawyers’ willingness to discuss human rights issues is the 
relationship with inside counsel.  As many interviewees commented, the 
development of a framework to deal with the human rights impacts of 
business activities is still in the early stages.  This means that lawyers also 
are in the early phase of determining how to raise these issues and what 
these developments means for their sense of themselves as professionals. 
A.  Lawyer Reluctance 
A common theme identified by interviewees was the reluctance by some 
members of the bar to accept that lawyers should provide advice on 
anything beyond enforceable legal provisions.  One interviewee who works 
with lawyers from various countries observed that there are some law firms 
that tell their lawyers not to discuss the Principles “because they are not 
law . . . my only job is to counsel you on what is the law.”102  Another said 
that even for inside counsel, there is a lot of discomfort with human rights 
because it is soft law.  “When it gets to the general counsel’s office it [can] 
get complicated because they’re lawyers and they feel much more 
comfortable advising on hard law.”103  A key obstacle to lawyers providing 
advice on human rights therefore is that these rights “started with 
international standards and norms and things that lawyers don’t usually deal 
with.”104 
One expression of skepticism about lawyers’ role to advise on the 
nonbinding duty to respect human rights was stated by Jonathan Goldsmith, 
Secretary General of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe 
(CCBE).  Commenting on the International Bar Association (IBA) 
guidance, Goldsmith questioned “whether it is useful for the IBA to publish 
something where so many of the difficult questions remain unresolved.”105  
He suggested that these questions include: 
 What does it mean to respect human rights when the role of 
lawyers is to advise on respecting laws (which may not always 
cover the human rights in question)? 
 What is the impact on the responsibility of lawyers—whether 
legal or ethical—to their clients if they advise on human rights 
rather than on the law? 
 Is there a distinction between advising clients about the existence 
of human rights standards which go beyond the legal 
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requirement, and advising clients that they must comply with 
those standards which go further than the law?106 
Interviewers suggested that a second source of lawyer reluctance is that 
some lawyers see advising on human rights as involving moral judgments 
about their clients.  As one lawyer noted: 
[H]istorically lawyers have always been very comfortable in putting a 
distance between us and the client’s commercial objectives:  “We just 
advise on the law, it’s not my role to question the client’s objectives.  
Clearly if they are illegal I can’t be complicit and I may withdraw my 
services, but if they want to sell tobacco products or mine uranium or 
move a community [off its land] that’s entirely for the client to 
decide.”107 
Lawyers’ tendency to think in terms of legal compliance programs also 
can create discomfort and uncertainty about their role with respect to the 
Principles.  One lawyer asked: 
What tick do you have to put in what box to do the right thing?  [F]or 
example, . . . if you find that you have a supplier and may have child labor 
in the supply chain, the old business approach to human rights before the 
[Principles] would say, “Okay, stop using the supplier so you can say you 
don’t have child labor in your supply chain.”  But everyone knows now 
that child labor is . . . a very complex issue and cutting those factories out 
of your supply chain may actually bring harm to the people you’re trying 
to protect.  So the new idea with the [Principles] is even when you pull 
out you have to think about what the human rights implications 
are . . . .  [I]t may be that your first step is to work with suppliers to try 
and put the children in school, change the rules about suppliers, it’s a 
whole process now that we need to go through. . . .  [H]ow could you 
express that in compliance terms?108 
One lawyer who has worked with companies from several countries 
suggested that U.S. lawyers’ advice tends to be driven more by 
considerations of legal liability than does advice from lawyers in other 
countries.  She recalls one company turning to both French and U.S. 
counsel for advice.  French counsel “basically advised [the company] to 
follow human rights principles.”109  By contrast, “the American legal 
advice was very strongly [based on] legal liability:  ‘Don’t do X, Y, or Z 
even though people are asking you to do it; just follow your legal 
liability.’”110  She suggested that in the United States, “[t]here is not a 
whole lot of understanding or even respect for the UN Guidelines; I think 
that’s in the legal culture.”111 
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On the other hand, some interviewees suggested that lawyers from civil 
law jurisdictions might be less receptive than those from common law 
jurisdictions to the notion that a lawyer should advise on open-ended 
standards in addition to formal legal provisions.  One interviewee suggested 
that the instinct in a civil law system is to say, “[H]ow do I think about what 
salient human rights impacts are?  [W]e need to elaborate exactly which 
ones [we’re] talking about, exactly what sorts of actions and impacts, and 
then I can deal with this.”112  Thus, the civil law lawyer will say, “We need 
to write our own code and elaborate every potential human rights adverse 
impact scenario [in sections] one through 510.”113 
Another lawyer from a common law jurisdiction, however, questioned 
whether the civil law system is quite this rigid.  He suggested it depends on 
the area of law involved: 
If you are an administrative lawyer dealing with environmental law, you 
tend to look at what the regulations provide, end of story.  But when you 
are dealing in a commercial context and you’re looking at negligence 
lawsuits judges are permitted to look at standards. . . .  I think that even in 
the civil law it’s not quite as black and white as you might think. . . .  A 
German judge in a commercial dispute is entitled to look at standards 
outside the law.114 
Interviewees thus indicated that there is resistance in some quarters to 
lawyers advising on human rights.  There may even be some who are 
unsure of how they would incorporate nonbinding standards into their 
conversations with clients.  Many interviewees, however, also suggested 
that the main obstacle to providing such advice may be that many lawyers 
simply are not familiar with the Principles. 
B.  Talking About Human Rights 
The interviewees indicated that business clients differ in their awareness 
of human rights responsibilities and the need for advice on them.  Not 
surprisingly, large multinational companies, those in the extractive 
industries, and companies with global supply chains are most aware of the 
human rights risks of their operations.  In contrast, the companies that 
appear to be least aware of human rights concerns are smaller national 
companies that focus on domestic markets.  Many of these national 
companies, however, are part of the supply chains of multinational 
businesses.  Several interviewees suggested that this likely will be an 
important impetus in increasing small and medium enterprise awareness of 
human rights impacts. 
Interviewees also suggested that lawyers find different ways to discuss 
human rights issues with business clients.  In general, the approach most 
likely to resonate with clients is to focus on the potential risks to the 
company of human rights violations.  Clients vary, however, in how 
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sensitive they are to different types of risks, which can range from the 
prospect of legal liability to criticism from consumers, investors, or local 
communities.  Furthermore, the Principles state that human rights risk 
analysis should focus on the risk to rights holders, not simply risk to the 
company.  This requires a shift in perspective.  As a result, interviewees 
expressed a range of opinions on how lawyers could best frame issues of 
business and human rights with their clients. 
C.  The Risk Management Lexicon 
Modern corporations spend a considerable amount of resources engaged 
in “enterprise risk management,” which “include[s] not just risks associated 
with accidental losses, but also financial, strategic, operational, and other 
risks.”115  Human rights violations can create such risks, which makes 
advising on how to prevent them seem like a natural topic to include in such 
analysis.  For this reason, the Principles suggest that “[h]uman rights due 
diligence can be included within broader enterprise risk-management 
systems.”116 
D.  Risk of Legal Liability 
One risk on which lawyers traditionally advise is the risk of legal 
liability.  If we think of the type of issues on which lawyers may advise as a 
set of concentric circles, the issue of legal liability constitutes the inner 
circle.  While there is some national regulation prohibiting egregious 
conduct such as human trafficking, the liability of companies in developed 
countries often depends on complex determinations of responsibility for the 
actions of subsidiaries or contractual partners in developing countries.  In 
light of this, in many cases the most immediate concerns about direct 
liability of major corporations tend to be based on compliance with 
reporting and disclosure requirements.   
Reporting and disclosure requirements generally do not restrict the 
company’s operations, but simply require information about them.  
Therefore, discussions about potential liability focus primarily on whether 
the information is accurate.  These discussions, however, have the potential 
also to direct corporate attention to human rights issues in a couple of ways.  
First, as one lawyer put it, “In order to get to the reporting outcome you 
have to implement processes which will allow you to come up with the 
information you need to report.”117  Assembling and analyzing the 
information necessary to make disclosure can lead to more wide-ranging 
conversations about corporate activities and the extent to which they risk 
violating human rights. 
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Second, disclosure can be a way of holding a company accountable to 
stakeholders and the public at large, regardless of any potential legal 
liability.  Reporting provisions typically require a company to disclose its 
efforts to avoid adverse human rights impacts.  A company that discloses its 
failure to make any efforts on human rights issues is likely to attract 
criticism that could affect its standing with customers, investors, or officials 
that may be in a position to grant or deny regulatory approvals.  
Furthermore, where convergence around appropriate practices is starting to 
emerge, companies that fail to adopt these practices are likely to be subject 
to similar criticism and potential adverse action by stakeholders.  
Discussions of compliance with reporting and disclosure requirements can 
create opportunities for lawyers to advise companies on the broader risks of 
human rights violations and the importance of minimizing them. 
Finally, the potential for convergence around appropriate compliance and 
reporting practices could have implications for corporate liability under the 
common law or customary international law.  Acceptance of certain 
standards by a majority of companies in a given industry, for instance, or 
those facing a common human rights risk, could lead to a judicial finding 
that acting in accordance with these standards is required to meet the 
appropriate tort law standard of care.  As one lawyer put it, “The standard 
of care is something that has evolved,” and there is “an expectation for 
[companies within an industry] that if the industry comes up with a code of 
conduct and you are not subscribing to that code of conduct something is 
wrong with you.”118 
The doctrines linking voluntary standards to legal liability are still in 
their infancy and will require further elaboration.  Lawyers performing the 
core function of advising on potential legal liability will nonetheless need to 
be attentive not only to statutory regulations, but also to evolving levels of 
commitment to soft law that may eventually crystallize in common law 
standards of conduct. 
E.  Legal Risks of Nonbinding Standards 
Lawyers may also advise on nonbinding standards when they are 
incorporated into legal documents, such as contracts with suppliers, joint 
venture partners, and creditors.  Compliance with these standards therefore 
becomes a legal obligation that is a condition of entry into and performance 
under these various agreements.  In the former case, failure to credibly 
demonstrate conformity with the standards may result in an inability to 
obtain financing for a project or foreclose the opportunity to enter into a 
potentially profitable business arrangement.  In the latter case, violation of 
the standards may require indemnification of a contractual partner or 
authorize termination of the contract. 
If the contractual partner is a host state, acceptance of standards may be a 
condition of bidding for a project, or violation of them may result in denial 
of approval or termination of the project.  Companies in developing 
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countries are now being encouraged to insist on protection of human rights 
and other assurances in investor agreements, with an increasing roster of 
lawyers and consultants providing assistance to them in negotiating and 
implementing agreements with such terms. 
Lawyers who act for companies that are parties to agreements that 
contain such standards need to advise their clients about the extent to which 
they may be in compliance or breach.  As with discussions about potential 
legal liability, such conversations can be the impetus for evaluating and 
strengthening a company’s processes for avoiding various types of adverse 
human rights impacts.  As one lawyer put it, this can impress upon clients 
“the need to be proactive and not simply react as issues or controversies 
arise.”119 
In addition, some government entities that are not contractual partners 
with a company may use information about the company’s failure to 
comply with nonbinding standards as the basis for adverse action.  Canada, 
for instance, provides that its Export Credit Agency is authorized to deny or 
terminate funding for a Canadian mining company that refuses to 
participate in an OECD NCP process initiated in response to a complaint 
against the company.120  More generally, it is not hard to imagine that a 
government agency that is deciding whether to issue a regulatory approval 
of some sort may well take into account a company’s record on human 
rights issues. 
Advising on the potential legal risks of failure to comply with human 
rights standards thus involves the lawyer in traditional legal counseling that 
can create the opportunity to expand awareness of the impacts of a 
company’s activities.  One lawyer expressed impatience with the notion that 
advising on soft law is any different from what lawyers regularly do in 
other contexts: 
A client sends me their code of conduct or their business ethics policy and 
says, “Well, do you think we’ve got a problem here?”  And the oil and gas 
mining sector or the telecommunications or electricity sector have got a 
bunch of codes and . . . template agreements dictated or agreed between 
the sector.  And lawyers quite happily interpret those documents, even 
though they’ve got no more standing from a national law perspective than 
any other documents.121 
F.  Nonbinding Standards As Hard Law in Waiting 
Transnational businesses operate in a world of considerable uncertainty.  
One significant source of uncertainty involves which regulatory provisions 
are likely to be imposed in the future, or what contract terms counterparties 
may request or financial institutions may require.  Lawyers who advise on 
nonbinding standards are in a position to offer some insight into these 
questions, thereby enabling clients to anticipate and plan for legal 
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requirements that may emerge down the road.  As one lawyer succinctly 
stated, “Soft law can be hard law in waiting.  The law is a lagging indicator 
of what’s considered ethical, so that what may be considered unethical 
today may be illegal tomorrow.”122  Another captured this idea by saying 
that nonbinding standards also include the “unspoken expectations of the 
public.”123 
Many lawyers drew analogies to the early days of concern about 
environmental issues.  There was very little hard law, and when “naming 
and shaming” proved ineffective, the government “pick[ed] the practices of 
the most . . . progressive companies and use[d] that as the basis for what [it] 
impose[d] on everybody else.”124  These voluntary practices were an 
important foundation for the numerous environmental statutes that 
eventually followed. 
This perspective suggests that a lawyer who discusses nonbinding 
standards with a client is advising on the “law” in an expansive sense that is 
sensitive to the fluid relationship among ethics, norms, and formal law.  She 
is attempting to provide a client not simply with a snapshot, but a moving 
picture. 
G.  Business Risk:  The Social License 
The preceding types of risks to a business arising from the human rights 
impacts of its operations can all be conceptualized in terms of gradually 
expanding concentric circles of legal risk.  It may be, however, that in some 
cases there is no plausible basis for conceptualizing the human rights risk to 
the company as falling within one of these circles.  At the same time, there 
may be other types of risks that are relevant to the client’s business.  Is 
there any role for the lawyer in advising on such risks?  Lawyers may not 
be able to claim any particular professional expertise with respect to them.  
At the same time, many of these risks will reflect stakeholder and public 
perception that the company has violated common ethical norms.  This is a 
matter with respect to which a lawyer may have insight because of the 
broad relationship between such norms and the law.  Many lawyers 
traditionally have fulfilled this role by acting as a client’s trusted advisor.  
To the extent that they act in this role, lawyers will bring to the client’s 
attention the various types of business risks that may result from imposing 
adverse human rights impacts. 
Advising on these risks requires an appreciation of the kinds of resources 
and support that the client needs to be successful and the extent to which 
violating human rights may jeopardize them.  Such risks may exist even 
when a company is in compliance with national law.  One lawyer provided 
an example involving a project that required moving an indigenous 
community: 
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There is under the national legislation an ability to move the 
community . . . but the compensation is very nominal and de minimis, and 
there is no right to have the decision reviewed.  We would say, “Well 
look, there is clearly a national law that deals with this, but from the 
United Nations Guiding Principles perspective you would also want to 
raise with the client perhaps the difference between the national law 
standard and international human rights standards.”  [Under the latter] you 
would expect a reasonable level of compensation and a review process or 
a grievance mechanism for those who were unhappy with the decision.125 
The lawyer continued: 
And you might try and explain why you are raising these issues with the 
client because they are not legal issues.  In other words, the client will ask 
the question, “What can I do?”  They are not interested in what else can I 
not do or should I be doing.  To that you can say, “Well, have you thought 
about from a business perspective the potential disruption, will there be 
protests, what’s this going to cost in terms of project delay, the impact to 
your reputation when you are on the front page of all the local 
newsletters, when perhaps you’ve got to go before a government 
commission and you want an approval for another project in two or three 
years’ time?”126 
Lawyers provided many other examples of business risk in our 
discussions.  A telecommunications company, for instance, may operate in 
a country in which an authoritarian government is facing pressure from 
dissidents who are mobilizing the population.  The government might 
respond with violence and request all transnational companies operating in 
the country to disable access to social media in order to reduce the prospect 
that further demonstrations will endanger its grip on power.  What should a 
company do?  A lawyer can inform the company of what the national law 
says about the authority of the government to issue such demands; but are 
there other considerations that go beyond the legality of the order that the 
company should consider?  On the one hand, failure to comply with the 
demand may well jeopardize the ability of the company to operate in that 
country—at least if the current regime remains in power.  On the other, will 
there be an outcry by the international community that the company is 
complicit in abuses by the regime? 
Less dramatically, a transnational company may be in a position to 
negotiate an investment agreement with a developing country that gives the 
company a lion’s share of the profits from a project.  The contract also 
could severely constrain the government from enacting any legislation that 
could impair the value of the project, which could include changes in tax 
law or worker health and safety regulation.  Should the company capitalize 
on its bargaining position to obtain the best possible terms under the 
contract?  Or should it accept a more equitable allocation of rights and 
obligations that generates more commitment by the host country and 
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provides a more sustainable social and economic environment for the 
company over the thirty-year life of the project? 
In both of these instances, compliance with national or local law will not 
necessarily insulate a company from criticism.  Depending upon the issue, 
there may be emerging international expectations of ethical behavior to 
which the public may hold a company.  These expectations are the basis of 
what some observers have called a company’s “social license.”127  This 
license reflects the public’s sense of the legitimacy of a company’s 
operations.  One lawyer suggested that, with respect to human rights 
impacts, “you certainly look at the risk of legal violations but you also look 
at the risk of what happens when you violate soft law global norms because 
that can cause all kinds of problems that can ultimately lead to the loss of a 
company’s social . . . license to operate.”128 
The likelihood that a company will be held accountable for breaching 
accepted public norms has increased substantially in recent years with 
advances in telecommunications technology and the rise of international 
NGOs and other significant actors in the transnational sphere.  One 
interview subject said that lawyers need to advise clients that “[p]eople are 
in touch with each other and NGOs are out there.  [There are] a lot of forces 
at work that did not exist ten or twenty years ago.  The impacts on people 
can lead to serious consequences.”129 
Discussion of business risks can also assist companies in gaining greater 
certainty about their operations.  In the face of what can seem to be 
amorphous and open-ended obligations with respect to human rights, 
companies may find that reliance on global standards provides them with 
greater predictability in their activities.  Thus, a company may agree to 
adopt international standards on community consultation with respect to 
extractive projects or agree to abide by the Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights with respect to the use of security services.  Once this 
occurs, the dynamics that we have described above can begin to hold a 
company accountable in a variety of ways for its commitment to such 
standards.  In this way, conversations with clients about business risks may 
set in motion a process that can protect human rights apart from a 
company’s concerns about its legal risks. 
A lawyer who advises a client on risks to its social license is not acting as 
a decision maker with respect to such risks.  Rather, her role is to ensure 
that the client is aware of these considerations in deciding how to proceed.  
Corporate management increasingly looks to both outside and inside 
counsel for advice on the full range of risks that a company faces.  As a 
scholar and corporate general counsel observed, “[L]egally astute top 
management teams take a proactive approach to legal matters.  They bring 
counsel in early to assist not only in assessing legal risk but also in creating 
a strategy and a plan of execution that maximizes realizable value while 
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eliminating any unnecessary legal or business risks.”130  Serving as the 
company’s lawyer requires contacts with persons throughout the 
organization, which can put inside counsel in a position to identify and 
analyze risks and opportunities across the full range of a company’s 
operations.  This feature of the job, along with lawyers’ traditional training 
in identifying and assessing risk, is resulting in more companies turning to 
lawyers for wide-ranging advice. 
IV.  BEYOND LEGAL AND BUSINESS RISK 
Focusing on expanding concentric circles of risk is a way to include 
human rights concerns within the enterprise risk assessments that an 
increasing number of companies are already performing.  Simultaneously, 
this focus on risks to the company is analytically distinct from an emphasis 
on risks to rights holders.  As the Principles emphasize, human rights due 
diligence needs to “go[] beyond simply identifying and managing material 
risks to the company itself, to include risks to rights-holders.”131  In keeping 
with this, the Principles also say, “Where it is necessary to prioritize actions 
to address actual and potential adverse human rights impacts, business 
enterprises should first seek to prevent and mitigate those that are most 
severe or where delayed response would make them irremediable.”132  This 
part discusses how business lawyers may be most effective in encouraging 
their clients to adopt this perspective. 
A.  Risks to Rights Holders 
It is understandable that lawyers attempting to minimize the adverse 
impact on human rights of business activities would tend to stress the risks 
to the company of imposing such limits.  Businesses generally operate in 
highly competitive environments.  Impacts on human rights thus may be 
most likely to enter into deliberations when they can be framed as potential 
costs to the company.  As a pragmatic matter, an effective way to minimize 
risks to rights holders can be to persuade management to minimize risks to 
the company, because this aligns the interest of the latter with the former. 
Such an approach reflects the view that outcomes are more important 
than motives in assessing behavior.  Philosopher Robert Goodin, for 
instance, suggests that simply identifying the moral dimension of an issue 
will not necessarily suffice to motivate changes in behavior (or need 
prompting concern with that dimension be considered the only measure of 
success).  As Goodin observes, most actions “probably proceed from a 
multiplicity of motives, some good and some bad . . . .  So in a way it does 
 
 130. Constance Bagley & Mark Roellig, The Transformation of General Counsel:  Setting 
the Strategic Legal Agenda 3 (2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2201246 [https://perma.cc/WJ4X-M675]. 
 131. UN Guiding Principles, supra note 2, at 18. 
 132. Id. at 26. 
2016] TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 2031 
not really even make very much sense to expect a conclusive answer to the 
question, ‘What motive[s] lay behind that act?’”133 
Consistent with this pragmatic approach, several lawyers who professed 
strong commitment to advancing business respect for human rights 
emphasized that their focus is on finding practical ways to reduce risks to 
rights holders rather than ensuring the purity of clients’ motives.  As one 
lawyer put it:  “If I can show them a way where they can make money and 
at the same time not . . . violate someone’s human rights that will allow 
them to continue to operate and at the same time give relief to these victims, 
then I’ve done my job.”134  Another lawyer who described herself as 
“passionate” about human rights issues commented, “I don’t think as a 
business community we’ve reached [a] tipping point” such that companies 
consider human rights impacts from a purely altruistic perspective.135  As a 
result, 
I think any conversation has to involve a reference to what value that 
client would see in this kind of proposition.  It might be as a shareholder 
or it might be at governance level, so it might be more of a management 
kind of issue than a profit issue.  But there has to be some kind of a 
sale.136 
At the same time, focusing on risk to the company will not necessarily 
always align the interests of the company and those affected by its actions.  
For instance, affected rights holders may not be in a position to exert 
pressure on a company that will affect its financial condition or its 
reputation with stakeholders such as customers, investors, or government 
regulators.  The Principles, for instance, declare that companies should set 
priorities based on human rights risks and based on the severity of the 
potential adverse impacts.  One lawyer, however, expressed skepticism that 
companies actually do this:  “I don’t know one company that actually 
prioritizes in that way.  Because they prioritize based on where the squeaky 
wheels are and where the company is going to get bit.”137 
A company that acts based on cost-benefit calculations thus may leave 
rights holders vulnerable to the possibility that in any given instance, the 
calculation will not favor taking their interests into account.  As Goodin 
puts it, “We want to get people to do the right thing regularly and 
systematically, and the surest way to do that simply has to be to get them to 
do the right thing for the right reason.”138  The best way to get a company 
to minimize risks therefore is for managers genuinely to be concerned about 
the persons who will be affected if those risks materialize.  When this 
occurs, people treat rights as a hard constraint that is not contingent on cost-
benefit calculations. 
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The challenge for business lawyers thus in effect is how to help inculcate 
a deontological perspective in clients who operate in a domain dominated 
by consequentialist thinking.  The lawyers we interviewed acknowledged 
the difficulty of this task, but some held out hope that it could succeed.  For 
instance, while risk management is a natural vehicle for discussions about 
the risks of adverse human rights impacts, these discussions do not 
necessarily sharply distinguish between the risks to the company and to the 
rights holders.  Even simply considering whether violations may occur that 
represent risks to the company requires imagining the reactions of average 
persons who are guided by the standards of ordinary morality.  This process 
of taking the perspective of persons outside the company requires 
imaginative evaluation of the company’s operations according to moral 
considerations rather than simply self-interest.  That evaluation may 
initially be for the purpose of determining whether public moral reactions 
will result in criticism of the company.  It seems plausible to imagine, 
however, that the habit of consulting ordinary morality will lead to moral 
standards being a direct, rather than derivative, influence on behavior. 
A second point is that it can be perilous for a company to try to 
differentiate between adverse human rights impacts that will and will not 
generate public criticism.  Social media has the potential to direct 
worldwide attention to an incident that occurs in a remote part of the world, 
and international NGOs have the capacity to generate ongoing campaigns 
that exert pressure on companies by alerting a variety of stakeholders.  This 
makes it prudent for a company to assume that every risk to rights holders 
is a risk to the company, which means that the best approach is to focus 
directly on potential victims. 
We can gain some insight into the possibilities for changes in business 
client perspectives from what has been called a “constructivist” approach to 
international relations.  That approach challenges the realist view that actors 
in the international realm operate on the basis of interests that are 
exogenous to norms and law and that it is these interests, rather than 
normative or legal considerations, that determine their behavior.139  
Constructivists argue for the importance of conceptualizing actors as 
members of social and discursive communities whose conceptions of their 
own interest may be reshaped by participation in such communities.140  
Interests, in other words, are endogenous to norms and law. 
This suggests that increasing attention to and discussion of the human 
rights impacts of business activities could gradually change companies’ 
understandings of their identities and interests.  Some companies already, 
for instance, purport to distinguish themselves as socially responsible.  
Even if this self-presentation initially is meant to serve instrumental 
financial interests, it creates an identity to which persons both inside and 
outside the company can hold it accountable.  A constructivist perspective 
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suggests that interaction among actors has the potential to solidify this 
corporate identity, so that it serves as a motivation for acting in socially 
responsible ways.  To the extent this occurs, what is in the interest of rights 
holders is in the interest of the company—not because of cost-benefit 
analysis, but because a particular conception of identity has been 
internalized in the company culture. 
Ultimately, it may be unrealistic to imagine that companies will focus on 
the risks of adverse human rights impacts without ever considering their 
impact on their own economic viability.  As one lawyer put it, counsel 
needs to emphasize that establishing priorities is about focusing on “the risk 
to humans, not to the company,” but “[i]t’s probably always going to be 
some sort of balance, because at the end of the day the people who make the 
decisions are looking at income.  So what you can hope for is some sort of 
balance.”141 
B.  The Role of Inside Counsel 
Another dynamic that shapes the likelihood and nature of lawyers’ advice 
on human rights issues is the relationship between inside and outside 
counsel.  Inside counsel have gained significant influence over the past few 
decades, and several interviewees saw them as crucial in sensitizing 
companies to the need to consider the human rights impacts of their 
operations.  One law firm lawyer commented:  “The in-house counsel [role] 
has changed.  They are starting to see . . . that they have a broader remit 
[that] may mean interacting with human rights issues.”142 
Their crucial role within the company thus means that “internal counsel 
are really the key to unlocking this for external counsel, giving them a level 
of comfort and confidence about raising [human rights] issues with 
clients.”143  Internal counsel who seek to raise awareness of these issues 
within companies can enlist outside counsel to play certain roles in support 
of such an effort.  Outside counsel can be in a position, for instance, to 
describe what other companies in an industry are doing with respect to 
human rights impacts, including commitments to adhere to certain 
voluntary standards.  They also can provide in-depth analysis of potential 
human rights issues based on familiarity with how standards are being 
interpreted and applied.  Additionally, they may be especially well-
positioned to advise on which standards are likely to be incorporated into 
hard law.  These roles reflect the fact that general counsel typically must be 
generalists who attend to a wide range of issues, while outside counsel often 
develop more focused expertise.  This can enable outside counsel to provide 
valuable support by reinforcing inside counsel initiatives.  As one law firm 
lawyer put it, “Our job is to help that person within the company who is 
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trying to drive change and give them as many arrows in their quiver as we 
can.”144 
To what extent are outside counsel likely to be the ones to initiate 
discussions of human rights, rather than respond to inside counsel requests 
for advice?  There was a divergence of opinion among our interviewees on 
how likely this is and on the extent to which it is the lawyer’s role to do so.  
As one lawyer stated, 
Normally the relationship between the lawyer and the client is such that 
the lawyer reacts to what the client wants and that’s kind of it. . . .  A 
lawyer has to be very, very careful when he or she starts trying to 
persuade a client to do something that the client isn’t already inclined to 
do . . . .  He can easily become labeled a troublemaker, an idealist, 
someone who is off the program if [he is] not careful.145 
At the same time, outside counsel may take the initiative because she 
wants to be seen as a trusted advisor rather than simply a purveyor of 
technical services.  As one lawyer noted, “It’s much more valuable when a 
firm becomes . . . a wise counselor than if it’s just a commodity provider of 
specialized services. . . .  I think outside counsel want to be able to 
understand how they can provide that wise counsel.”146  Another lawyer 
echoed this point: 
[T]he climate for outside counsel lawyer is so competitive you need to 
have an advantage . . . .  What differentiates you is what extra value you 
[are] bringing.  If you are a lawyer who knows about these principles, 
who understands them, who can translate that into language that your 
client can (a)  appreciate and (b)  profit from, you are going to be at an 
advantage . . . .  You can convey the information and they can take that 
information and use it to build their business.  You provide a service . . . a 
valuable service.147 
Outside counsel also may come to see herself as having a professional 
responsibility to raise concerns about human rights impacts.  The IBA 
guidance says:  “[A]dvising business clients on how to manage their legal 
risks by preventing and mitigating their involvement in negative human 
rights impacts falls within a lawyer’s ethical obligations under the IBA 
International Principles [on Conduct for the Legal Profession].”148  Rule 1.1 
of the European Bar’s Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European 
Community states that a lawyer’s ethical obligations include those that she 
owes to “the public for whom a free and independent profession . . . is an 
essential means of safeguarding human rights in the face of the power of the 
state and other interests in society.”149  The American Bar Association’s 
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report accompanying its resolution endorsing the Principles, for instance, 
stated: 
It bears noting here that ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1 
may well apply in this context.  It requires lawyers to exercise 
independent professional judgment and render candid advice and permits 
them to refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, 
economic, social and political factors that may be relevant to the client’s 
situation.  This imperative logically would include applicable 
international standards in the conduct of a client’s affairs, including the 
Framework and Guiding Principles where corporate clients are 
concerned.150 
 The reference in Rule 2.1 to discussing considerations beyond law is 
framed in discretionary rather than mandatory terms.151  This means that 
perceptions of what constitutes “law” will have an important bearing on the 
scope of the lawyer’s duty under Rule 2.1 and similar professional 
standards.  One lawyer did suggest, however, that the day may come when 
a lawyer’s failure to advise a client of the potential risks to the company 
arising from, say, local opposition to a project could lead the client to allege 
that the lawyer failed to provide adequate advice.152  The fluid relationship 
among international norms, standards, and hard law thus may have the 
potential to reshape understandings of the lawyer’s role. 
Finally, law firms conducting human rights due diligence may result in 
occasions for lawyers to initiate discussions of the impacts of client 
activities.  The IBA guidance states that law firms as businesses can be 
expected to meet the responsibility to respect human rights in all of their 
activities (including in their employment of lawyers) and in their business 
relationships, both with other law firms and business enterprises such as 
suppliers, and in the services they provide to their clients.  Law firms that 
fail to respect human rights can therefore expect to be increasingly 
exposed to similar legal and non-legal risks as other businesses that also 
fail to do so.153 
In order to meet its obligation, a law firm “needs to assess whether there 
are any actual or potential human rights impacts that may be directly linked 
to the firm’s services for a client.”154  The IBA guidance suggests that a 
firm may be seen as contributing to an client’s adverse human rights impact 
“when it provides services to enable the client to take actions that are legal 
(or at least not clearly illegal), but which the firm knows, or ought to know 
in the exercise of reasonable due diligence, will result in adverse impacts on 
human rights.”155 
A firm that has such a due diligence process in place to avoid 
contributing to human rights violations could make it easier for its lawyers 
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to initiate discussions of human rights issues with clients by enabling the 
lawyers to say that they are simply following standard firm policy.  The 
extent to which firms are willing to put such a process in place may vary, 
however.  First, firms may contest the assumption that they should be 
regarded as contributing to a client’s human rights violations in any 
instance in which they are simply providing advice on what conduct 
complies with the law.  The traditional view of the lawyer’s role as a neutral 
partisan is that representation of a client “does not constitute an 
endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or 
activities.”156  On this view, the lawyer is not morally accountable for how 
the client chooses to use her advice as long as the lawyer does not counsel 
or assist the client in conduct that the lawyer knows is “criminal or 
fraudulent.”157 
Some lawyers we interviewed, however, suggested that the standard 
conception of the lawyer’s role may not be as persuasive when a lawyer is 
acting in an advisory capacity, as opposed to when she is engaged in 
litigation.  Indeed, some lawyers stated that they themselves do not accept 
this concept in the advisory context.158  This is because an advisor can be a 
vital partner in helping a client imagine and pursue a specific course of 
action, as opposed to a litigator who encounters the client’s conduct after 
the fact and attempts to fashion the best explanation for it.159  The advisor 
thus arguably bears more responsibility for the behavior of the client than 
does the litigator. 
Second, a firm may be reluctant to establish a due diligence process 
because it fears that doing so may strain relationships with current and 
prospective clients who may regard the firm as passing moral judgment on 
their activities.  A due diligence process therefore will need to be widely 
adopted among law firms in order to avoid this potential competitive 
disadvantage.  Otherwise, “people are just cutting themselves out of the 
market in order to have somebody else pick up that work.”160  This suggests 
that there may be a collective action problem among firms; none may want 
to risk being disadvantaged by being the first to inaugurate human rights 
due diligence, even though firms would be better off if all agreed to do so.  
The market dynamics by which firms may overcome this obstacle would 
require analysis beyond the scope of this Article, but it is important to 
recognize the challenge. 
CONCLUSION 
A lawyer’s willingness and opportunity to advise business clients on the 
nonbinding elements of the duty to respect human rights is likely to vary.  
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Advising on soft law that may have hard law consequences is the role with 
which lawyers are most likely to be comfortable and is an activity that falls 
within the core of their traditional professional responsibilities.  Some 
lawyers may be uncomfortable with moving beyond that core to focus on 
broader concerns.  At the same time, many major corporations now expect 
general counsel to provide an assessment of the full range of risks that the 
company may face.  The pervasiveness of social media and the activities of 
NGOs can make potential adverse human rights impact a significant risk for 
some companies.  This suggests that inside counsel—at least in major 
companies—may increasingly attend to this risk.  It remains to be seen 
whether an established role for outside counsel will emerge from this 
process.  As many interview subjects commented, we are in the early phase 
of attention to the human rights impacts of business activities.  This means 
that lawyers also are in the early phase of determining what these 
developments will mean for their sense of themselves as professionals. 
The emergence of a transnational governance regime in general, and 
efforts to minimize adverse human rights impacts from business activities 
in particular, challenge conventional understandings of what constitutes law 
and regulation.  They reflect a dynamic process that involves complex 
interaction among informal norms, public expectations, voluntary 
standards, economic incentives, and codified rules of behavior.  The 
different spheres of activity that constitute this regime each have the 
potential to establish a variety of expectations based on cosmopolitan 
values that may trump compliance with national or local legal requirements.  
The spheres also have the potential to impose sanctions that are distinct 
from legal liability.  This state of affairs can create uncertainty for 
transnational companies with respect to the standards of behavior to which 
they will be held accountable. 
Lawyers may be in a position to help business clients reduce this 
uncertainty by advising on how companies can minimize the risks of human 
rights violations.  This Article has suggested that some lawyers’ 
conceptions of law and regulation may create reluctance to assume this role.  
However, this Article also explored the ways in which some lawyers are 
finding occasions to embrace it and framing their advice to clients when 
they do.  All the subjects we interviewed expressed the view that attention 
to business and human rights is gaining significant momentum that is 
unlikely to abate.  It remains to be seen whether and how business lawyers 
will accept what could be an opportunity to integrate their roles as 
representatives of clients and as professionals with some responsibility for 
the public good. 
